Heterogeneous panel causality tests are employed to consider the relationship between urbanization change and economic growth (i.e., differenced logged GDP per capita). Incomeand geography-based panels demonstrated substantial variation in that relationship. Urbanization caused economic growth in high income countries, but non-causality could not be rejected for both middle-income and Latin American countries. A bi-directional, equilibrium relationship was uncovered for low-income, predominately African countries where economic growth had a positive, causal effect on urbanization, but where urbanization, in turn, had a negative, causal effect on economic growth. Hence, urbanization and economic growth either co-evolve, as they do for low income/African countries and (likely) for high income countries, or else the two processes are somewhat decoupled, as they are for middle income and Latin American countries, despite their high degree of correlation.
Introduction and background
The level of world urbanization crossed the 50% mark in 2009; the United Nations expects that over the next 40 years urban areas will absorb virtually all of the projected 2.3 billion global population growth. The highly intertwined relationship between economic growth/development and urbanization is well recognized (Henderson 2010 )-specifically, both economic development and urbanization are associated with the shift of labor from agriculture to industry and services. Indeed, for modernization theorists, urbanization is both a by-product of economic development/growth and a proxy for modernization (e.g., Gibbs 2000) . This paper adds to the urbanization-economic growth/development literature by testing for Granger-causality between urbanization and the natural log of real GDP per capita using the most current heterogeneous panel methods and a large panel of developed and developing countries.
A key reason urbanization tends to accompany economic development is the industrialization process through which the typically rural agricultural labor force migrates to the typically urban manufacturing plants. Beyond employment prospects, development can encourage urbanization (through rural to urban migration) for other opportunities like access to culture, education, and health care. But urbanization or large cities have been thought to drive economic growth, too, via advantages in economies of scale in infrastructure (transport and telecommunications), capital, labor, and managerial resources (e.g., Wheaton and Shishido 1981) . More advanced economies can benefit from concentration through knowledge spillovers. Similarly, the mutually reinforcing phenomena of people with high human capital being attracted to areas of high quality of life, and aspects of quality of life (education, health care, arts) being driven by people with high human capital, helps to create centers of excellence and innovation in multiple but not necessarily related fields, as is the case in Silicon Valley, CA or Bangalore, India. Lastly, it is well noted that urban economies are more productive than rural ones, i.e., cities produce a disproportional amount of national GDP (Beall and Fox 2009; Liddle 2013a ).
On the other hand, urbanization may not so much be a catalyst for economic growth, as be evidence of economic progress. Indeed, Henderson (2010) argued that the relationship between urbanization and development " … is an equilibrium not causal relationship" (p. 518). Furthermore, urbanization is a transitory process in which, at some level of population living in urban areas, nearly all countries will cease to urbanize any more-i.e, they become " fully urbanized" (Henderson 2003) . At the same time, the structure of the economy and GDP per capita may, and usually will, continue to change/rise. Furthermore, taking OECD countries as an example, the level of urbanization for fully urbanized countries varies considerably. For example, the level of urbanization has changed very little since 1950 for both Austria and Belgium (having increased by only 6% since then or 0.1% per year); yet, their current urbanization levels are substantially different, 68% and 97%, respectively. Another way to appreciate the different paths urbanization and economic development have taken in different countries is to consider Figure 1 , which shows the GDP per capita (in log form)-urbanization paths for Africa, Asia, Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), and Western Europe as a whole, over the long-term (from the 19 th century to present). Figure 1 indicates that there were rather extended periods for Africa and Latin America where urbanization was experienced but was unaccompanied by economic growth. By contrast, periods of sustained economic growth appear always to be accompanied by urbanization. Also, Asia and Africa currently are at similar levels of urbanization, but Asia has a substantially higher GDP per capita; whereas, LAC has only a slightly higher GDP per capita than Asia, but LAC is considerably more urbanized. These phenomena have led some to question whether Africa and LAC are over-urbanized (e.g., Todaro 1995; Fay and Opal 2000) .
Figure 1
Previous urbanization-GDP causality, cointegration analyses
Although there is a substantial literature focusing on the urbanization process and its Liddle (2013b) argued urbanization has a " ladder" effect on economic growth: it has a strong negative impact for the poorest countries, a less negative to neutral impact for countries with moderate incomes, and a growth promoting/reinforcing relationship for the wealthier middle income countries and wealthiest countries.
Furthermore, that " urbanization ladder" effect was confirmed by the individual country estimations. When the individual country urbanization elasticity estimates were plotted against the corresponding country sample period average GDP per capita, the urbanization elasticity displayed an increasing relationship with average income.
Data, pre-testing methods and results
Real GDP per capita comes from the Penn World Tables (the constant chain Table 1) . 2 Yet, when first differences are taken, for GDP per capita cross-sectional dependence is mitigated (highly so for the middle-and low-income panels since their absolute value mean correlation coefficients are now quite small); for urbanization crosssectional independence cannot be rejected for the middle-and low-income panels, and crosssectional dependence is mitigated for the high-income panel. The reasons cross-sectional dependence is more prevalent in the high-income panel after differencing may be (i) that the high-income countries (by definition) have experienced more consistent, persistent economic growth (the first difference of GDP per capita) than other countries, and (ii) that those highincome countries tend to be fully urbanized, and thus, have experienced similar low rates of urbanization change. Table 2 . 3 Those results do not provide evidence to question our a priori belief (which is motivated by previous research discussed above) that urbanization and GDP per capita are I(1) or difference stationary variables. 
Causality testing methods, results, and discussion
The Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) test of Granger non-causality for heterogeneous panels is based on the stationary fixed-effects panel model:
where D is the difference operator, U is urbanization, I is the log of income for country i (i=1,2,…N) in period t, g and b are parameters that vary across countries, and e are residuals be inconsistent (Pesaran and Smith 1995) . Lastly, while the approach of Dumitrescu and
Hurlin as currently formulated does not explicitly address cross-sectional dependence, it is important to note that, after first differencing our two variables, either cross-sectional independence cannot be rejected or any remaining cross-sectional correlation has been highly mitigated (see Table 1 and accompanying discussion).
Using up to three autoregressive lags, bivariate regressions were employed to assess optimal lag length for each individual country. When urbanization was the dependent variable, Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) showed that for 98 out of 100 countries one lag was the optimum (two lags and three lags were optimum for one country each). When GDP per capita was the dependent variable, the BIC suggested one lag was optimal for 95 countries, two lags was optimal for four countries, and three lags was optimal for one country. Hence, for robustness we report the causality results for both one and two lags in Table 4 .
8 Table 4 The top panel of Table 4 displays the panel p-values for the non-causality test. While non-causality is rejected in both directions for an all countries panel, income-based disaggregation indicates that causality is heterogeneous and based on development level. For high income countries, causality runs from urbanization to economic growth; whereas for middle income countries, non-causality cannot be rejected in either direction; different still, for low income countries, non-causality is rejected in both directions.
Also, when geography is considered, it becomes clear that the causality in the low income panel reflects a predominately African phenomenon-Haiti, India, and Nepal were the only non-African, low income countries for which non-causality was not rejected. Indeed, bi-directional causality is found for the African panel too. Although the over-urbanized idea has been applied to Latin America as well as Africa, non-causality cannot be rejected in either direction for the Latin American panel.
The bottom panel of Table 4 indicates the number of countries in each panel for which the non-causality hypothesis could be rejected at the 10 percent level. There is evidence of heterogeneity within the various panels since, even for panels in which noncausality is rejected at a very high significance level, the individual countries for which noncausality is rejected form a minority of that panel. Yet, if there were really no causality, then we would expect to reject the hypothesis, and would accept causality in 10 percent of the countries if we use the 10 percent significance level for our test. Thus, rejections of no causality in substantially more than 10 percent of countries can be taken as evidence against the hypothesis that there is no causality in any country (an asterisk indicates panels for which a statistically significant number of countries, at the 1 percent level, reject non-causality).
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The tests displayed in Table 4 indicate the direction of the causal relationship (i.e., which variable " causes" which variable); but those causality tests do not determine the sign of that relationship (i.e., whether the variables move together-a positive relationship-or counter to one another-a negative relationship). Based on the results of Liddle (2013b), we assume that the sign of the causal relationship from urbanization to GDP per capita is dependent on development level, so that it is negative for low income/African countries but positive for high income countries. While we expect the sign of the causal relationship from GDP per capita to urbanization to be positive for all development and urbanization levels, we are not aware whether such an empirical determination has been made. Hence, for the low income and Africa panels we employ a system-GMM regression 10 to confirm such a positive relationship.
We use system-GMM since bi-directional causality was determined for those panels, and this method can address endogeneity via lagged instruments. System-GMM results are robust estimates with the finite-sample correction of Windmeijer (2005) and a constraint on instruments set by principal component analysis. As Table 5 indicates, the results demonstrate that the causal relationship from GDP per capita to urbanization indeed is positive for both the low income and Africa panels (following the previously discussed BIC results the optimum lag length is one). The Arellano-Bond serial correlation, AR(2), test statistic confirms that the bivariate model with one lag is correctly specified. Although the Sargan test statistic is significant, Hansen test statistic that is robust to heterogeneity suggests the instruments are appropriate. Table 5 Hence, for low income/African countries the mutual causality between economic growth and urbanization forms a balancing feedback loop (i.e., one negative and one positive relationship). In other words, economic growth leads to greater urbanization, which in turn, retards further economic growth. A balancing feedback loop suggests an equilibrium relationship-a finding in concert with a conclusion of Henderson (2010) .
Conclusions
We performed heterogeneous panel causality tests on urbanization change and economic growth (i.e., differenced logged GDP per capita). While an all countries panel suggested bi-directional causality, income-and geography-based panels demonstrated substantial variation in the relationship. Urbanization caused economic growth in high income countries, but non-causality could not be rejected for both middle-income and Latin
American countries. A bi-directional, balancing feedback (i.e., equilibrium) relationship was uncovered for low-income, predominately African countries where economic growth had a positive, causal effect on urbanization, but urbanization, in turn, had a negative, causal effect on economic growth.
Despite that today' s developing countries have policies explicitly attempting to control urbanization (Henderson 2010) , it is not clear how our results might inform policy.
That urbanization causes economic growth in high income countries would seem to have minimal relevance for today' s developing countries since nearly all of those high income countries were already rich and fully urbanized at the onset of our study coverage; furthermore, urbanization occurred at a slow pace that played out over 100-150 years (Henderson 2010) . Also, non-causality in either direction could not be rejected for middle income or Latin American countries, and the bi-directional relationship for low-income, African countries was determined to be of equilibrium character. Hence, perhaps the policy message could be summarized as: urbanization policies should be motivated by factors other than achieving/encouraging economic growth (i.e., such policies should be concerned with issues like equality and improved health and educational access), and policies to facilitate economic growth should not focus on urbanization.
The paper' s title asks a question: which comes first-urbanization or economic growth? As for answering that question, it would appear that urbanization and economic growth either co-evolve, as they do for low income/African countries and perhaps/probably for high income countries (since those countries were already high income and either highly or fully urbanized when our data began), or else the two processes are somewhat decoupled, as they are for middle income and Latin American countries, despite their high degree of correlation. The z statistic follows the standard normal distribution; whereas, the P statistic follows the Chi-square distribution. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at 5% and 1% significance level, denoted by * and **, respectively. Table 4 . Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) heterogeneous panel Granger-causality test results.
GDP Þ Urban
Urban Þ GDP Figure 1 . Urbanization-development paths. The level of urbanization is plotted against natural log of GDP per capita for four regions. The paths begin in 1800/1820 (urbanization/GDP per capita data) and continue to present (2008/2010, GDP per capita/urbanization data). Because of data availability, there is some variation in the timing of the intermittent points; however, each region has regular decade-wise observations from 1950 onward. The GDP per capita data is from Angus Maddison (http://www.ggdc.net/) and is in 1990 international GearyKhamis dollars. Urbanization data beginning in 1950 is from the UN World Urbanization Prospects (http://esa.un.org/unup/); whereas, the earlier urbanization data is from Bairoch (1988) . 
